





THE ROLE OF ENTERPRISE LOGIC IN THE FAILURE OF ORGANIZATIONS 







Director: Information Technology Management Program (ITMP) 
























Dramatic changes in the global business environment over recent decades are 
foregrounding the need for new competitive strategies by organizations. The recognition 
that success in the era of knowledge capitalism depends upon the creative productivity of 
knowledge workers is focusing attention on the forms of intangible capital – in particular, 
social capital and morale capital – that underpin creativity, learning and innovation as 
sources of competitive advantage. In this paper, we argue that many organizations are 
failing to execute mission-critical change because their leaders fail to comprehend how 
such change is inhibited by the ‘enterprise logic’ of the organization. Through the case of 
an Australian financial services company, we show that the functional hierarchical 
structure - that underpins the prevailing enterprise logic and is still a characteristic of 
most large organizations – has embedded in it the strategic intention of managerial 
control. We argue that this, in addition to other features of the rational-legal culture 
perpetuated by this structural form, effectively prevents the execution of innovative 
competitive strategies based upon the generation and leveraging of crucial intangible 
capital resources. The key implication of our findings is the need for leaders to envision 
and develop a form of enterprise logic that is predicated on new structural forms that 











Dramatic changes in the global business environment, brought about by advances in 
technology and politico-economic competitive pressures over recent decades, are 
foregrounding the need for profound change in organizations. The role of structure in 
either facilitating or inhibiting transformation has been widely recognized, and the 
concept of enterprise logic has proved useful in analysing the deep structure that informs 
every aspect of organizational practice. The prevailing enterprise logic of most 
organizations, a legacy from the era of industrial capitalism, is underpinned by a 
functional hierarchical structure that Max Weber described over a hundred years ago as 
one that promotes rationalism and inhibits personal engagement in organizational life. In 
this paper we argue for the creation of a new form of enterprise logic – one that will 
allow the creativity and learning capabilities of all staff to be developed and leveraged. 
This, we contend, is the key leadership task in the era of knowledge capitalism.  
 
We begin with a definition and explanation of the concept of enterprise logic, and a 
critique of the role of the prevailing enterprise logic in sustaining an inappropriate 
managerial (or industrial) form of capitalism. We go on to draw attention to the particular 
forms of learning and knowing required in the era of knowledge capitalism, and the 
intangible capital resources that promote the necessary engagement in learning processes. 
Through the case of a failed change initiative at a financial services company, we explore 
how the prevailing enterprise logic, in hegemonic fashion, inhibits the requisite learning 
and knowledge creation practices. In conclusion, we argue for the development of 
leadership frames of reference that demystify the concept of enterprise logic, and thus the 
'deep structure' of organizations, and thereby facilitate the structural transformation 
required for mission-pertinent learning. 
 
The Role of Enterprise Logic in Organizational Performance 
Enterprise logic has been defined as the 'overall logic shaping a firm's strategy, structure, 
and management processes into an effective whole' (Miles et al, 1997: 7). It refers to the 
deep structure (or ideological underpinning) of an organisation, and is based upon a set 
of shared assumptions, values and attitudes that are manifested in the taken-for-granted 
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everyday practices of the organisation. In order to operate at this subconscious level, 
enterprise logic must become part of the broad cultural expression of a society. This is a 
process in which structural arrangements are put into place (particularly with respect to 
principles and practices of power and resource management) and gradually become 
manifest in cultural norms (shared assumptions, or mental models, with respect to 'how 
the world works'). This ultimately leads to patterns of behaviour that reflect the 
hegemony of this logic. Over time, a range of institutional, organisational and individual 
(socio-psychological) practices, that sustain shared assumptions about the 'reality' of 
these ideological arrangements, become formalised.  
 
Zuboff and Maxmin (2002:10) argue that managerial capitalism (what we refer to as 
industrial capitalism) has provided the standard enterprise logic across much of the world 
over the past hundred years. It replaced proprietary capitalism (and the form of enterprise 
logic that dominated that economic era) because it could better address the transaction 
economics of mass consumerism through new technologies, organisational forms and 
practices that delivered low-cost products and services. This required 
a new managerial hierarchy with a relentless internal focus on the 
control and measurement of production and distribution. Managers and 
engineers inherited the task of planning and overseeing a minute 
division of labour to accomplish the standardization, increased 
throughput, and reduced unit costs necessary to meet the new demands 
of mass consumption (Zuboff and Maxmin, 2003: 20) 
 
The enterprise logic of industrial capitalism was built on the structural foundations of the 
functional hierarchy (bureaucracy). Over a century ago, Weber (1970 ed.) showed that 
this form was designed for explicit management control and was intended to denude the 
organization of individual passions in the interests of rational-legal administration. He 
argued that, within a bureaucracy, 
the 'objective' discharge of business primarily means a discharge of 
business according to calculable rules and 'without regard for persons'. 
... When fully developed, bureaucracy also stands in a specific sense, 
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under the principle of sine ira ac studio (without anger or passion). Its 
specific nature ... develops the more perfectly the more the bureaucracy 
is 'dehumanized'; the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from 
official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and 
emotional elements that escape calculation. This is the specific nature of 
bureaucracy and it is appraised as its special virtue (Weber, 1970 ed.: 
215-216 – our translation of the Latin phrase) 
Weber (1970 ed.: 216) argued further that the bureaucratic structure thus requires 
personally detached and strictly objective experts – functionaries who are unmoved by 
human passion and who perform their function without emotion, gratitude or favour. 
Created to transform proprietary capitalist forms of administration into specialized 
administrative functions operating according to purely objective considerations, the 
functional hierarchical structure enabled the first wave of globalization and the era of 
industrial capitalism that underpinned it.  
 
Learning and Knowing in the Era of Knowledge Capitalism 
While the functional hierarchical structure served the needs of industrial capitalism very 
well, profound political, economic and social change over the past three decades - fuelled 
by advances in technology and new competitive pressures - has led to the emergence of 
radically different criteria for organizational success. There has been growing recognition 
in the literature that organizational performance in the new era of knowledge capitalism 
depends increasingly upon the capacity of organizations to learn and to innovate. The 
distributed nature of knowledge in organizations requires that collaborative learning and 
knowledge construction activities be facilitated, cherished and celebrated. Making this 
point, Gee et al (1996: 58), state that, 
in the new capitalism it is not really important what individuals know on 
their own, but rather what they can do with others in a collaborative way 
to effectively add ‘value’ to the enterprise.  
The creativity of knowledge workers has to be fostered, as does their passionate 
identification with the purpose and goals of the organization and their full commitment to 
enacting its core strategies (see, for example, Boyett & Conn, 1991; Gee et al, 1996; 
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Peters, 2003). Workers in the current era of knowledge capitalism are required to become 
psychologically and emotionally engaged in their work even if that attachment may be 
transitory.  
 
Of particular importance in this respect are intangible forms of capital that are generated 
and leveraged 'in community' – in particular, social and morale capital. Social capital is a 
form of capital that is collectively owned by members of a 'network' characterized by 
strong relationship bonds and multiplex connections to other 'networks', and involves  
resources such as trust and voluntary cooperation between all those who hold a stake in 
the mission of the organization (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Morale capital refers to 
resources such as passionate identification with, and commitment to, the purpose of the 
organization (Dovey & Singhota, 2005). These forms of capital consist of social 
resources that are constructed and leveraged through network relationships and without 
which the network would not be able to function at an optimal level.  
 
The most critical of these resources is trust, as it underpins the capacity to leverage many 
of the other resources potentially available to the network either through its members or 
through its partner networks (connections). Learning and knowing are social capital 
resources because they are developed and leveraged through specific kinds of 
relationships (Leonard-Barton, 1995; Choo, 1998; Wenger, 1999; Lave & Wenger, 
1991). Once trust - and the social norms of reciprocity and voluntary cooperation that go 
with it - is established, network members have access to vital human capital (knowledge 
and other resources that are embodied in individual members) and morale capital 
(resources such as passion, commitment, motivation, courage and resilience that are 
rooted in, what Nahapiet & Ghoshal (1998) call, 'identity resources'). The processes of 
learning and knowing depend heavily upon the availability of these intangible forms of 
capital within a network and upon the capacity of network members to leverage them. 
The unique aspect of these forms of capital is that they are not depleted but re-generated 
through their exploitation. 
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The mobilization of these resources, however, requires structural/cultural forms 
characterised by distributed power/authority bases and opportunities for enterprise-wide 
collaboration and learning (Dovey & White, 2005). Legacy structural forms, embedded in 
an outmoded form of enterprise logic, are clearly no longer appropriate. This began to 
become evident almost thirty years ago when Mintzberg (1979: xii) made the claim that 
'structure seems to be at the root of many questions we raise about organizations'. In the 
digital era, structure has come under increasing scrutiny (Dell, 1999; Foster & Kaplan, 
2001; Miles et al, 1997; Peters, 2003) and its role has been highlighted in specific areas 
of organisational performance, such as the capacity to innovate (Dougherty, 1999; 
Leonard-Barton, 1995; Barley, 1986); enact strategy (Davies, 1993); become more 
entrepreneurial (Miles et al, 2000); construct new knowledge (Lave & Wenger, 1991; 
Wenger & Snyder, 2000; Dovey & White, 2005); and meet customers' needs more 
effectively (Zuboff & Maxmin, 2002). 
 
The role of structure and the difficulties faced by hierarchically-structured organizations, 
in terms of their capacity to compete in the digital era, have also been highlighted in a 
dramatic way by recent global political events. As Friedman (1999) points out, we are 
currently witnessing a new form of military/political competition in which a 'super-
empowered' individual/group, using a decentralized, virtual, organizational form that 
effectively leverages exceptional levels of social and morale capital, and the new 
information and communication technologies, in the service of a passionately owned 
mission, has consistently trumped a global superpower, hamstrung by its hierarchically-
structured military and government organizations. The effectiveness of Al-Qaeda in 
surviving the best efforts of the USA to defeat it over the past decade, has led Tom Peters 
(2003) to claim that this new global military conflict is not one that will be decided by 
weaponry but by organizational form (on this point, see also Grint, 2005). 
 
The Need for a New Form of Enterprise Logic 
It is becoming increasingly evident that global changes are impacting the hegemonic 
logic of industrial capitalism. In this respect, Zuboff & Maxmin (2002: 290) call for a 
new 'support' economy, based on relationship value and the principles of what they refer 
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to as distributed capitalism (what we call knowledge capitalism), to replace the 
transaction value of industrial capitalism. They argue that the emergence of a new 
economic paradigm generally requires that three conditions be met: new customer needs 
or market conditions; new enabling technologies; and a new form of enterprise logic 
through which changes in authority and power management practices can be legitimated. 
They go on to claim that two of the three conditions for a global economic paradigm 
change are now in place. Firstly, consumers (and knowledge workers) have new needs. 
They refer to these as deep support needs, which must be fulfilled in order to pursue a life 
of psychological self-determination, and contend that these needs cannot be met by 
organizations designed for the industrial capitalist era. Secondly, they argue that the new 
digital technologies are able to support the 'smart coordination and collaboration 
capabilities' and structural forms necessary to provide affordable deep support to millions 
of consumers. They acknowledge, however, that the third condition for a global 
economic paradigm change – the establishment of a new and appropriate form of 
enterprise logic – has not yet been met.   
 
Contemporary pressures to innovate mean that the new enterprise logic would have to be 
characterised by new organisational forms that spawn cultural discourses reflecting a 
strong sense of ownership among all stakeholders of the organization. Such ownership 
would be underpinned by passionate commitment to the mission of the organization; the 
shared values of its stakeholders; and creative participation in its everyday activities. It 
would be characterised by, what Gee et al (1996: 58) refer to as, ‘non-authoritarian’ 
distributed power bases. In such an environment of decentralized authority, risk would be 
managed through the socialization of all members to cultural norms that dictate the 
framing of all decision-making by the mission and values of the collective. A covenantal 
culture would be created in which the destiny of each is viewed as being bound up with 
the destiny of the others. A consequence of this would be that learning would become 
viewed as an obligation to the collective. Because learning involves personal risk and 
potential vulnerability, and is thus highly sensitive to power management practices, it 
requires a 'negotiated order' in which power relations are governed democratically 
through a set of mutually-endorsed and personally-binding core values. However, the 
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realisation of the requisite new form of enterprise logic will be difficult to achieve under 
current organizational arrangements where authoritarian power relations, rooted in 
positional power bases, often serve specific functional and managerial purposes at the 
expense of the interests of the organization as a whole. 
 
The Bases of Resistance to Change 
While leaders in organizations are becoming aware that survival in the era of knowledge 
capitalism requires radical change, their articulation of change often remains at the 
rhetorical level. The idea of distributed ownership, leadership, authority, knowledge and 
responsibility, within cellular, network, or federal organisational structures, poses a 
considerable threat to those (managers and workers alike) who have internalised (or who 
have a personal interest in sustaining) the enterprise logic of industrial capitalism.  
 
It is our contention that the primary source of effective resistance to change by managers 
is the functional hierarchical structure. When change is attempted it is usually on an ad 
hoc basis, within existing organisational arrangements, and seldom addresses the kinds of 
structural change necessary for the transformation of management processes and 
everyday work practices. As a consequence, structural and cultural inhibition of change 
persists in many organisations.  
 
Case Study of a Failed Attempt at Organizational Transformation 
In order to explore these issues against the backdrop of everyday practices in an 
organization, we present a study of a failed change initiative at a large Australasian 
financial services company (hereafter "the Company"). The case consists of a brief 
‘strategic story’, in which the Company’s attempt to transform itself is outlined, followed 
by an interpretative analysis in which we apply our argument to explain how structurally-
induced defensive behaviour by the Company’s leadership undermined the learning and 
innovation required to transform the Company. 
 
The study was conducted as an action research project within the Company and was 
designed to include an 'insider' (Company-based researcher) and an 'outsider' (university-
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based researcher) dimension. Bryan (the second author) initiated the research project 
when he was informed that he had been promoted to the role of the Project Management 
Office (PMO) manager.  In order to ensure the success of the newly-created PMO at the 
Company, Bryan obtained permission from the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the 
Company to engage in an action research process through which he hoped to sustain the 
learning and renewal required for its success. Bryan asked Ken (the first author), who had 
previously supervised his postgraduate research at the University of Technology, Sydney 
(UTS), to co-manage this research project with him in order to provide an outsider 
perspective on what was essentially an insider action research project (for the benefits 
and disadvantages of insider action research, see Coghlan, 2003). As a participant-
observer in the research process, Bryan kept an Observations Journal and a Learning 
Journal (that contained detailed reflection on his everyday practice and on Company 
events). In his professional role as manager of the PMO, Bryan had access to a broad 
range of official documentation that included the minutes of meetings, electronic and 
paper-based communications, and business data that included Company results. Ken's 
role can best be described as that of an 'external critic' (see Sarason, 1972): someone who 
is intimately interested in the project but who provides an outsider's perspective; who is 
independent enough to challenge the interpretations and analyses of the insiders; and who 
is respected enough by the insiders to be taken seriously by them. In addition to this role, 
Ken conducted interviews with a variety of insiders in order to access their interpretations 
of events and issues pertinent to the research project. Although the CEO distanced 
himself from aspects of the authors' analysis, he agreed to the publication of this research 




Like many organizations operating in today's dynamic business context, the Company 
has adopted a 'management by projects' approach whereby much of its work is organized 
as a series of simultaneously executed projects (see Fenech & Dovey, 2005). This 
approach has facilitated the Company's aggressive new product development program 
that is focused on information products delivered through communications technologies. 
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A key challenge in such a multi-project management environment is the fact that the 
demand for projects usually exceeds the resource capabilities of the organization. 
 
Historical Context 
The Company came into existence as the result of a merger driven by the threat of entry 
into the Company’s market of a much larger, better resourced, global business. While the 
parties to the merger possessed distinct histories, cultures, processes and systems, both 
found themselves in a similar predicament. After computerizing their operations during 
the 1980s, custom-building at great expense the core business applications that enabled 
them to leverage economies of scope and scale that their local competitors could not 
match, it became possible, post Y2K, to replicate these core business applications 
relatively cheaply. Thus, while technology initially gave each of the parties the means to 
create the barriers to entry that made their markets secure and profitable, soon thereafter 
technology razed those barriers leaving both parties vulnerable to attack from larger 
players. 
 
Six months after the merger, fears of a much larger and resource-rich overseas competitor 
entering the market were realized and the Company’s share price lost more than 40% of 
its value as investors anticipated that market share would come under increasing pressure. 
At this time, the Company announced a bold new mission to become the ‘leading 
provider of choice’ in Australasia. The Company’s strategy outlined a vision of 
operational excellence (with statements such as ‘achieving lowest cost best practice’; 
‘world class IT enablement’; and ‘building organizational capability’) and signalled 
intentions of cultural transformation (with slogans such as ‘passion, values and 
recognition’; ‘performance-based rewards’; and the ‘encouragement of innovation’).  
 
Organizational Structure 
The Company restructured itself into five strategic business units focusing on different 
market segments, and five functional silos (Group Finance, Group IT, Human Resources, 
Legal and Administration, and Group Sales). Group IT was sub-divided further into four 
functional silos (Client Services, Infrastructure Services, Product Services and Practices). 
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Product Services, the area primarily responsible for project management and the 
undertaking of project-based work (predominantly of a cross-functional nature), was also 
structured as a traditional functional hierarchy consisting four sub-departments (Solution 
Delivery, Solution Design, Solution Development and Solution Assurance). 
 
History of Failure to Execute Innovative Strategies 
Driven by the need to accelerate the integration of the two merged businesses and to 
engage its new competitor by rapidly developing new products and services, the 
Company extended itself well beyond its organizational capacity, by over-committing to 
projects. The Company failed to complete a series of projects (known as the Quick Win 
Projects) that aimed to accelerate the integration process, within their scheduled six-
month time-frame (some of these projects were still active eighteen months later). With 
most projects experiencing slippage against plan, the ‘hump’ of project work that needed 
to be surmounted was pushed back month after month as new projects were approved and 
initiated. Estimates for key projects were reported as ‘highly at risk’ due to an inability to 
secure the human resources required to undertake critical project tasks. Several of these 
key projects failed to meet their delivery dates with the result that their anticipated 
contribution to the Company’s EBITDA for that financial year was not realized, and the 
Company was criticized, with respect to its profit predictions, in the financial press after 
twice lowering its earnings forecast. 
 
A Bold Strategic Initiative and its Collapse 
At this point, the Company responded by undertaking a program (the Program), initiated 
by the manager of its Program Management Office (PMO), aimed at extending the 
function of the PMO to include a more proactive and strategic role in the Company’s 
project selection decisions. Specifically, the PMO would manage the legislative 
framework created by a Program Governance Board (Steering Group) comprised of 
senior executive managers and the manager of the PMO, with the purpose of ensuring an 
explicit and transparent basis for project selection and investment decisions. The 
framework was based on a project portfolio selection methodology (PSM) whereby a 
portfolio of projects would be selected 'from available project proposals and projects 
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currently underway, that meets the organization’s stated objectives in a desirable manner 
without exceeding available resources or violating other constraints’ (Archer and 
Ghasemzadeh, 1999: 208). 
 
This methodology, recognized globally as best practice with respect to managing 
investment decisions in a multi-project environment, produced significant business 
benefits over the six months that it was in operation. These included: 
 increased project throughput compared to the previous twelve months; 
 increased return on investment in projects compared to the previous twelve 
months; 
 stopping several projects that were of dubious value resulting in cost savings and 
the freeing up of resources to work on more valuable projects; 
 establishing an overall plan that sequenced projects over a six-month period 
according to relative value, subject to organizational and environmental 
constraints; 
 reducing the Company’s portfolio of major projects to a more manageable 
number – from fifty down to twelve; 
 building project management competency in project teams. 
 
Despite this success, after six months of operation the Company announced the 
retrenchment of the PMO Manager and the disbanding of the PMO on the grounds of 
'reducing a management overhead'. Without the PMO there to drive it, the project 
portfolio selection methodology was from that point no longer followed and the Senior 
Executive Managers ceased meeting as a Steering Group. 
 
Subsequently, over an eighteen-month period, the Company failed to deliver a $15M 
program of work aimed at re-engineering its core business applications and processes (the 
largest it had ever attempted), spending most of its capital budget in the process, and the 
CEO was replaced by the Board. Thereafter, the Company re-established the PMO 
function, expending significant effort and cost on hiring new personnel, retrieving and 
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reviewing the disused project portfolio selection and related process documentation, and 
attempting to re-introduce the abandoned work practices. 
 
Resistance to the Program 
At the outset of the Program, project owners and project managers viewed the new 
requirements to provide information about their projects to the PMO as ‘more red tape’ 
and as ‘preventing them from doing their real job’. In the past, such requirements had 
been spoken of as ‘snake oil’ and exhortations to ‘just do it’ would be made, even in the 
case of large international development projects, with the consequence that contracts 
were signed that committed the Company to delivery dates without prior feasibility 
planning. This attitude was reflected in extremely poor reporting, both in quality and 
timeliness. However, within three months of the introduction of the Program this 
resistance had dissipated. A training session provided by the PMO was well received by 
project owners and project managers and one particularly ardent and vocal critic, who 
had previously refused to comply with the project portfolio selection methodology, 
became a champion of the process. By the fifth month of the Program's operation, the 
standard of reporting by project owners and project managers was excellent and, without 
exception, they had become passionate supporters of the project portfolio selection 
methodology and the expanded role of the PMO. 
 
In contrast, resistance from functional managers was much slower to arise; however, 
when it did arise it effectively led to the termination of the Program. Initially, functional 
managers accepted the Program, following the lead of the CEO who endorsed it at a 
rhetorical level as ‘the way we now do things here’. However, as they became aware of 
its implications for power management practices within the organization, the new work 
practices and the mandate of the PMO were challenged, with some managers 
encouraging their staff to refuse to cooperate. Ironically, the project portfolio selection 
methodology began to be criticized as being ‘bureaucratic’ and ‘prescriptive’ by those 
who had helped define it and the PMO labelled a ‘roadblock’ by those who had 
participated in setting its Charter. Over time, human resources were unilaterally re-
allocated from projects by their line managers contrary to project selection decisions 
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made by the Steering Group. Line managers began ignoring meeting requests, telephone 
calls and emails from project owners and project managers seeking information about 
human resource availability. In one particular conflict between a project manager and a 
line manager, the latter asserted ‘the right to pull [the resource] off any project, regardless 
of the project impact’. Personal attacks were made on the PMO Manager and, in contrast 
to the training sessions delivered to project owners and project managers, training 
sessions delivered by the PMO to functional and line managers were openly sabotaged. 
 
Reassertion of Positional Authority.  
During the operation of the Program, the functional managers of the Product Services 
Department released new project management and systems development methodologies 
that contradicted those introduced through the Program. At the expense of best practice in 
project management and systems development, these methodologies sought to embed 
into process standards – by enshrining rational legal processes governing the conduct of 
all project activities and decision making – power relations that favoured functional and 
line managers over project managers. A ‘waterfall’ model was imposed in which project 
activities were organized into phases that corresponded to the functional boundaries of 
the Product Services Department, and, rather than entrust projects to autonomous cross-
functional teams led by project managers, a serial assembly line process was imposed 
which required each department to perform its ‘phase’ of project activities in isolation 
before handing over to the next department. Under this model, authority for prioritizing 
activities, allocating specific human resources and approving deliverables lay with 
functional and line managers, with project managers stripped of the decision-making 
authority delegated to them by the Program. 
 
Retreat from Transparency.  
As functional managers began to understand the implications of the Program for their 
personal and functional power bases, they increasingly reverted to covert and sectarian 
strategies - recreating an atmosphere of secrecy and mistrust in the process. An example 
of this is provided by an excerpt from the Observations Journal of the PMO Manager 
 16 
that relates to his request to obtain a copy of the new project management and systems 
development methodologies shortly before their release: 
I then requested a copy of the document from the Group IT Manager 
(Product Services) explaining that the CIO had given me his approval. 
He directed me to the Solutions Assurance Manager who was in 
possession of the master documents. I then sent an email to the Solutions 
Assurance Manager. He replied by email directing me to a Consultant 
who was coordinating the process definition activities, with the 
suggestion that it was not appropriate for the document to be released 
outside of IT while it was in draft form. This reply was copied to the 
Consultant. I then emailed both the Consultant and the Solutions 
Assurance Manager and explained that I had been given authority to 
access the document by both the CIO and the Group IT Manager 
(Product Services). The Consultant then called me to discuss how I 
would use the document and to extract an assurance from me that I 
would not let the document be seen by anyone either inside or outside 
the IT function; specifically asking me not to let the document be seen 
by any of the project managers. To this I agreed. A copy of the 
document was then sent to me by email by the Solutions Assurance 
Manager with a covering note emphasizing ‘FOR YOUR EYES ONLY’ 
and ‘ONLY A DRAFT’. 
 
To Learn or Not to Learn 
Shortly before the disbanding of the Program, semi-structured interviews conducted with 
senior functional managers, project owners and project managers revealed significant 
differences in attitudes toward the Program and the learning gained from it. Despite the 
business results obtained through the new work practices, senior functional managers 
expressed a preference for the traditional approaches to managing projects (approaches 
that had been proven inadequate in the Company). For example, there was a strong 
preference for the traditional functional organizational form and its sequential assembly 
line approach to managing projects, over the autonomous cross-functional team approach 
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supported by the Program and generally recommended within a multi-project 
environment. One executive manager stated that "for the bulk of projects, I would rather 
the assembly line approach …unless it's something like … where I think it's such a major 
project that it requires 100% commitment from people on the project itself". Another 
claimed preference for the assembly line "because of the matrix and the resourcing that’s 
required behind it, because we always have more projects than we have people 
available". Preference was also expressed for curtailing the autonomy of project teams 
and integrating them back into the functional operational structure. One manager stated 
that "project teams should not be autonomous. They should be part of the operations side 
of the business. Exceptions may be major projects that are going to go over a twelve-
month period where you’re probably better off to isolate them so that you do develop a 
culture within the project team. But I believe that most projects should be part of business 
operations.” Significantly, a number of responses by executive managers reflected an 
apparent lack of understanding of basic procedural aspects of the project portfolio 
selection methodology in which they had been participating over the previous six months. 
 
In contrast, at the project team level, project owners and project managers questioned the 
need for strong functional line management – such as that imposed by the Product 
Services Department through its project management and systems development 
methodologies – in an enterprise where most work is organized as projects and where 
these projects are prioritized, scheduled and coordinated by a Steering Group. Consistent 
with best practice, they favoured greater autonomy for tightly-knit cross-functional 
teams, and resented intrusions by functional and executive management. In a focus group 
setting with project managers, the view was strongly expressed that “the selection 
methodology and the PMO protect the process from petty squabbling”. This group 
exhibited a sound understanding of the project portfolio selection methodology, the roles 
of the PMO and the Project Governance Board, and possessed strong opinions about 





Analysis of the Failure of the Company to Introduce an Innovative Management Practice 
The case of the Company illustrates how, rather than foster lateral power relations and 
engage in enterprise-wide mission-pertinent learning, functional managers were able to 
undermine the innovative practices introduced by the Program. Initially, while still 
unsure of the Steering Committee's commitment to the Program, they operated on an ad 
hoc basis, making arbitrary decisions to reallocate resources assigned by the Program to 
project teams. However, as the reluctance of executive managers to face the political 
consequences of the Program became apparent, functional managers more aggressively 
re-claimed authority with respect to project decisions and resource management. They 
did this via two specific methods of power management: 
• Managing power ‘downwards’ by re-asserting bureaucratic protocols and 
procedures that have been taken-for-granted in the Company for decades. The 
'logic' of these practices appears to be so embedded in the cultural life of the 
Company that few employees protested the actions of line managers in arresting 
the change process at the expense of superior business performance and 
recognised best practice. Similarly, there was no protest from staff at the 
destruction of the nascent culture of trust and enthusiasm that the Program was 
beginning to foster, by the re-introduction of these protocols and procedures. By 
leveraging the structurally-induced mental models of staff with respect to power 
and its sources of legitimacy in organizations, functional managers were able to 
sabotage the new work practices in open defiance of the new democratic decision-
making processes that had been introduced through the Program.  
• Managing power ‘upwards’ through the threat of political disharmony. The re-
instatement of traditional strategies-in-action (bureaucratic protocols and 
procedures and traditional project management methodologies) by functional 
managers exploited prevailing cultural values regarding competitive 
individualism, short-term thinking, and the pre-eminence of individual and 
sectarian interests. At the same time, it effected a revival of the cultural 
phenomenon of false consensus in functional hierarchies. In this ‘game’, all 
members of the enterprise (wittingly or unwittingly) participate in the charade of 
strategic planning while tacitly knowing that the prevailing strategies-in-action 
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are the way ‘the world really works’. In functional hierarchies, the process of 
formulating 'espoused strategies', which cannot be executed, is as much an 
accepted part of management routine as are the 'strategies-in-action', which are 
usually not made explicit, but which are easily executed courtesy of the enterprise 
logic. This results in a situation of strategy-contradiction. When faced with an 
open rebellion from functional managers, the executive management of the 
Company very quickly chose political harmony over business transformation and 
superior results. As salaried leaders, they appear to have viewed such a strategy to 
be in their own interests. Interestingly, this reversion of the entire executive 
management contingent to the traditional order occurred without questions about 
the legitimacy of their strategic turn-around from anyone in the Company other 
than the PMO manageri.  
 
The constraints imposed upon strategy execution by the taken-for-granted structure and 
culture of the organization, are invisible because of the socialization of staff to the 
prevailing enterprise logic. The socialization process reifies structural and cultural 
conditions, so that they are perceived as ‘natural’. On this point, Zuboff and Maxmin 
(2003: 21) argue that, 
the standard enterprise logic has become so deeply taken for granted that 
it is no longer visible. People do not question assumptions that they no 
longer see. … Change management would not be the industry it is if 
organizations were changing. Change management is huge precisely 
because organizations are not fundamentally changing. … the standard 
enterprise logic is organized to reproduce itself at all costs, even when it 
is commercially irrational to do so. It is through these processes, so often 
undiscussable, that organizations defy change, even when they say they 
are changing. 
 
As the explicit logic of the Program contradicted the tacit enterprise logic of the 
Company, its validity in the minds of all staff was tenuous at best. This was evident 
throughout the Program. For example, during training workshops and when attempting to 
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encourage compliance with the Program, the PMO Manager found it necessary to 
identify with the managerial hierarchy in order to ensure his legitimacy in the minds of 
the workshop participants. A consequence, therefore, of the functional hierarchical 
structure is an organizational culture wherein the link between espoused strategy/values 
and strategy/values-in-action has been mystified, enabling leadership failure to be easily 
rationalized (see Sarason, 1972; Gardner, 1965). In this kind of organizational culture, 
salaried executive managers are able to protect their self-interest through risk-averse and 
conservative practices. 
 
Functional managers, at first guided by assumptions that the change initiative would fail 
as many previous change programs in the Company had failed, tolerated the new order 
until it became clear that this change was being driven by someone (the PMO manager) 
who was resolute about its implementation. From our observations, once measured 
business benefits began to be explicitly documented and tabled at the Steering Group 
meetings, the moment for open rebellion by functional managers had arrived. At that 
point they realized that unless stopped immediately, the Program would permanently 
transform the old order of the Company. Through veiled threats by some, and less subtle 
forms of aggressive confrontation by others, line managers initially attempted to persuade 
the PMO manager to allow 'greater flexibility' in the operation of the new practices – a 
tactic that would have undermined the integrity of the Program and thus destabilized the 
new order. When this failed to stop the progress of the transformation, the only remaining 
action left was to sabotage the Program and ensure that the PMO manager was 
retrenched. Thus, because the logic of the Program could not be resisted on rational 
business grounds by the executive management of the Company, it brought into play the 
full range of insidious defensive mechanisms available to those who have a vested 
interest in undermining change in organizations structured as a functional hierarchy. 
 
Transforming Structural Form in the Interests of Learning 
In spite of the increasing signs that functional hierarchical structures are inhibiting 
mission-pertinent learning in organizations, this organizational form persists, and 
functional 'experts' – who Sullivan (quoted by Peters, 2003) describes as 'very expensive 
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microchips' – continue to dominate decision-making in organizations. Little heed has 
been taken of statements, such as that of Deprez & Tissen (2002: 1) that 'the 
organizations we created have become tyrants. They have taken control, holding us 
fettered, creating barriers that hinder rather than help our businesses', and the prediction 
of Boyett & Conn (1991: 109) that 'in Workplace 2000, rigid hierarchies will be 
dismantled, as will ceremonial trappings of power', seems naïvely optimistic in 
retrospect. As Jacques (2003: 137) points out, over 85% of the workforce in 
economically developed nations is still employed in hierarchically structured 
organizations. 
 
The transformation of the ‘deep structure’ of organizations - change that ‘alters the basic 
structures and therefore affects every premise, assumption and activity that derives from 
or depends upon those structures’ (Zuboff and Maxmin, 2003: 19) is clearly a difficult 
task. The relatively recent introduction of the so-called matrix structure with the claim 
that it offers ‘the best of both worlds’ by preserving ‘the benefits, such as information 
sharing and continuity, of the functional department structure, while enabling cross-
functional coordination on a project basis’ (Payne, 1993: 240) seemed for a while to offer 
organizations a way to 'have their cake and eat it'. By combining functional specialization 
with cross-functional business product or project specialization, and superimposing a 
product or project structure on an existing function-based structure (with resources 
assigned from vertical units to horizontal units - see Alsène, 1999 and Van Der Merwe, 
2001), it was hoped that the constraints of the functional hierarchical structure could be 
overcome. However, as the case study demonstrates, functional silos continue to 
dominate decision-making and power management practices in such hybrid structures 
(Alsene, 1999; Bishop, 1999; Miles et al, 1997; Payne, 1993). As Bishop (1999: 9) 
argues, ‘it is the functional departments (that often control the resources and information 
vital to the success of the cross-functional team) that can and often do sabotage the 
efforts of the cross-functional team’. Thus the emergence of the matrix structure can be 
seen as an example of ‘adaptive’ rather than 'deep' change, enabling leaders of functional 
hierarchies to successfully accommodate pressure for structural transformation without 
fundamental change to the political status quo.  
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With suitable frames of reference regarding the relationship between structure and 
mission accomplishment, leaders need to explore the range of organizational forms that 
are emerging as appropriate alternatives to the functional hierarchy. Such forms include 
cellular (Miles et al, 1997); federal (Handy, 1994); hypertext (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 
1995); communities of practice (Wenger, 1999) and network (Lipnack et al, 1994) 
structures. At the core of each of these alternative structures is the concept of stakeholder 
co-ownership and an emphasis upon lateral power relations between them. These 
principles, however, may constitute the biggest challenge for leaders groomed in 
hierarchically structured organizations, as these leaders are required to sponsor the 
process of their own disempowerment – to empower others by transforming the structure 
of the organization in ways that facilitate the development and liberation of the 
entrepreneurial capabilities of all staff (Foster & Kaplan, 2001; Boyett & Conn, 1991). 
The political culture embedded in organizations historically structured as functional 
hierarchies, makes most business leaders deeply suspicious of such a strategy. In a study 
of the introduction of cross-functional project teams in functionally and hierarchically 
structured organizations, Bishop (1999: 7) argues that, 
... in many cases, the culture of the firm encompasses decades of 
established business practices and formal functional reporting structures 
and … going to a team culture could be personally counterproductive for 
[it’s] leaders, who are the very people who need to sponsor the activity 
to change the organizational culture! 
 
We have argued that in functional hierarchical organizations management control is a 
more powerful need and entrenched mental model than the need for business results. 
Thus, it may take dramatic events and crises in organizational performance, such as those 
predicted by Peters (2003), before such mental models are re-visited. In addition, it may 
require the same level of publicity and transparency of the results of business 
organizations as is the case with elite sports teams, for business leaders to elevate the 
need for results above that for control. Even with the (cognitive) support of the leader, 
structural transformation is difficult, in that, at the first sign of a crisis, the leader's old 
mental models about structure, authority and control are likely to be re-asserted and the 
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inappropriate power management practices that emanate from them to be re-enacted 
(Kim, 1993; Kets de Vries, 1993).  In this respect, drawing on Sarason's (1972) concept 
of an 'external critic', Dovey & White (2005) argue the need for an extra-organizational 
role through which the power of those with formal authority in business organizations 
can be mediated effectively in the interests of relevant organizational transformation. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we have explored the role of the prevailing enterprise logic in the inhibition 
of the transformational learning required in organizations that are attempting to compete 
through innovation. We go on to argue for a new form of enterprise logic – one 
characterized by emergent structures, shared ownership, and broadly distributed ‘non-
authoritarian’ power bases – through which the creativity and learning capabilities of all 
staff can be built and leveraged.  
 
We have attempted to outline some of the difficulties involved in the transformation of 
the enterprise logic in organizations. In particular, our argument has focused upon the 
irony that the factors that made the functional hierarchy so successful as a structural form 
in the industrial capitalist era – namely the ‘de-humanization’ of the workplace through 
the principle of sine ira ac studio; the functional division of work; and the establishment 
of hierarchical power relations – are at the heart of its inhibition of the creativity and 
learning required for success in the era of knowledge capitalism. Through the use of a 
case study, we have shown that the transformation of this legacy structure (and the 
learning-averse culture that it spawns) is a very difficult task – one that many 
conventional leaders in organizations are ill-equipped to manage.  
 
The key implication of our findings is the need to broaden the concept of leadership in 
organisations to incorporate the role of 'structural architect'. Given the distributed nature 
of knowledge and the other key intangible resources necessary for creativity and 
innovation in organizations, the orchestration of organizational change requires the 
identification and implementation of new structural forms to underpin the development of 
a more appropriate form of enterprise logic. This, we show, is a complex and difficult 
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task that requires managers to ‘give away’ their power in order to realize it in new shared 
forms – something that it is unlikely to happen in organizations where the prevailing, and 
taken-for-granted, enterprise logic militates against such action. 
 
We recognise that action research – and particularly insider action research - is 
vulnerable to bias and unconscious distortion with respect to the political and knowledge 
interests of the researcher(s) (see Coghlan, 2003). Thus our portrayal of the dynamics of 
organizational transformation in the Company may well have been influenced 
unwittingly by our roles and interests – especially those of the PMO manager. 
Furthermore, given the privileged relationship the ‘external’ action-researcher enjoyed 
with the PMO manager (whose postgraduate research he had supervised over several 
years), as opposed to his relationship with other senior managers in the Company, and the 
politics surrounding the retrenchment of the PMO manager, it is possible that such 
circumstances unintentionally influenced the analysis of the case study. While not 
necessarily undermining the validity of our analysis, issues such as these endorse the 
need for further research – particularly action research - into the complex role of, and 
relationship between, enterprise logic, ownership, and leadership in organizations that are 
seeking to innovate as a competitive strategy. However, while the 'deep insights' 
facilitated by insider action research are crucial to gaining a clearer understanding of 
these complex relationships, such insights need to be evaluated against a backdrop of 
broader methodological perspectives. In offering a detailed analysis of one company’s 
failure to transform, we hope to provoke further research and debate around the role of 
enterprise logic in an organization’s capacity to learn and innovate.  
  
                                                 
 
i In the Australian context, the pervasive assumption of hierarchical structures as 'the way the world works' 
is an unfortunate consequence of the colonial history of the country and the fact that most large 
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